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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although humans have played sports since ancient times,1 the 
idea of the professional sports “league” is a relatively new concept.2 
Indeed, prior to 1876, American professional sports teams competed 
in a decentralized, informal system where teams set their own 
schedules and the rules varied from game to game.3 Recognizing the 
inefficiencies of such a system, professional sports club owners began 
organizing into centralized leagues.4 Initially, these leagues served 
basic functions, such as establishing uniform rules, creating a schedule 
of games, and resolving disputes between club owners.5 Today, 
professional sports leagues such as the National Football League 
(“NFL”) are multi-billion dollar global enterprises,6 responsible for 
coordinating a wide variety of activities between their member teams. 
The issue confronting the Supreme Court in American Needle, Inc. 
v. NFL is whether the NFL and its thirty-two member teams are best 
described as separate actors or as a “single entity” for antitrust 
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. DONALD G. KYLE, SPORT AND SPECTACLE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 7 (2007). 
 2. See Marc Edelman, Why the Single Entity Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs: A 
Primer On Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 891, 891–904 (2008) (discussing Major League Baseball’s progression from “club-
based” property rights to a “mixed” system of private and common property rights). 
 3. Id. at 897–99. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 899. 
 6. Michael K. Ozanian et al. eds., The Business of Football, 2009, FORBES, Sept. 2 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/02/nfl-pro-football-business-sportsmoney-football-values-09-
nfl_land.html. 
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purposes.7 This determination is of particular importance, as the 
Supreme Court has held that although separate actors may violate 
antitrust law, a “single entity” cannot constitute the “plurality of 
actors” implicitly required for imposing liability under Section 1 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act.8 Because the Seventh Circuit’s decision to 
uphold the NFL’s single entity claim9 was a significant departure from 
the holdings of other circuit courts,10 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to clarify whether the NFL is a single entity, and whether 
similarly situated joint ventures may also qualify for antitrust 
exemption under the single entity rationale. In light of the far-
reaching implications such immunity would have in the context of 
professional sports leagues, especially in the field of player contracts, 
some experts say American Needle may turn out to be the “most 
important legal decision in sporting history.”11 
II. FACTS 
Formed in 1920 as a joint venture of already-existing professional 
teams, the NFL is an unincorporated, non-profit association of 
professional football franchises.12 Each team is separately owned and 
controlled.13 The NFL does not have ownership interest in any team, 
and no team or owner owns an interest in any other team.14 By 
agreement, NFL member teams share some revenues, such as those 
from television contracts.15 Other revenues, such as parking and 
concessions, are not shared.16 Each individual team also owns its own 
intellectual property, which includes teams’ logos and marks.17 
In 1963, to facilitate the licensing of their intellectual property, the 
teams formed a joint venture called NFL Properties (“NFLP”).18 
 7. Brief of Petitioner at i, American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, No. 08-661 (U.S. Sept. 18, 2009). 
 8. A “single entity” may still be held liable for anticompetitive activity under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). 
 9. American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 10. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, American Needle, No. 08-661 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2008). 
 11. See Dan Fletcher, Five Supreme Court Cases to Watch This Term, TIME, Oct. 5 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1927760,00.html (“Indeed, the bargaining power 
of the NFL Players Union is based on antitrust legislation that the league would largely be 
immune to if it receives a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court.”). 
 12. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 2. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at 3. 
 15. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 2. 
 16. Id. at 3. 
 17. Id. at 4. 
 18. Id. 
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Petitioner American Needle, Inc., is an Illinois company that, prior to 
2001, was one of several companies licensed through NFLP to 
manufacture and distribute hats featuring NFL team logos.19 Faced 
with declining merchandise sales in the late 1990s, the NFL’s thirty-
two member teams collectively decided to change their intellectual 
property licensing practices in the hopes of increasing profits.20 In 
2000, the teams entered into an exclusive ten-year intellectual 
property licensing agreement with Reebok, agreeing not to grant 
licenses to Reebok’s competitors for ten years.21 Following the 
agreement, American Needle’s license was not renewed.22 
Subsequently, American Needle filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, claiming that the exclusive 
license granted to Reebok constituted both an unlawful restraint of 
trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and an attempt to 
monopolize under Section 2 of the Act.23 Prior to discovery, the NFL 
and its member teams filed for summary judgment, arguing that teams 
act as a single entity when licensing and marketing their intellectual 
property, thus exempting them from Section 1 scrutiny under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube 
Corp.24 
Conceding that “others might well disagree,” the district court 
granted summary judgment, supporting its single entity finding by 
noting that “the separate ownerships [of the teams’ intellectual 
property rights] had no economic significance in and of itself, and 
American Needle, Inc. does not suggest that it ever dealt with any of 
the teams as independent organizations.”25 The district court also 
found that the teams’ single entity status defeated American Needle’s 
claim under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.26 American Needle 
promptly appealed.27 
 19. Brief for the NFL Respondents at 10, American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, No. 08-661 (U.S. 
Nov. 17, 2009). 
 20. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 6. 
 21. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 10, at i. 
 22. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 7, at 8. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 25. American Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 496 F. Supp.2d 941, 944 (N.D. Ill. 
2007). 
 26. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 7, at 9. 
 27. American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Originally passed in 1890, the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits 
“every contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several states.”28 Because nearly every 
business transaction inherently restricts trade by taking that 
transaction out of the competitive market, the Supreme Court soon 
realized that a practical, rather than literal, interpretation of the Act 
was needed.29 In 1918, the Court held in Board of Trade of Chicago v. 
United States that the “true test of legality” under the Sherman Act is 
“whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition.”30 This standard became known 
as the “rule of reason”31 and established a two-tiered system of 
antitrust liability.32 In situations where the anticompetitive nature of 
an agreement is plain, the agreement is per se unlawful.33 Such 
situations are generally limited to a small subset of particularly 
“pernicious” agreements such as price-fixing or bid-rigging 
agreements.34 More typically, where an agreement is not plainly 
anticompetitive, the rule of reason applies.35 In these situations, an 
antitrust plaintiff must establish two elements: First, that a contract, 
combination, or conspiracy restraining trade exists, and second, that 
the agreement in question is in fact unreasonable. 36 The antitrust 
plaintiff must show that the particular agreement has an actual 
negative effect on competition or provide facts from which an 
inference of negative effects can be made.37 The antitrust defendant 
may then offer evidence of “procompetitive justifications for the 
restraint,” after which the Court must balance the evidence and 
determine whether the positive effects of the restraint outweigh the 
 28. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2008). 
 29. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies 
rule of reason analysis, under which antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular 
contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found 
unlawful.”). 
 32. See James T. McKeown, Antitrust Developments in Professional Sports: To the Single 
Entity and Beyond, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 363, 365–66 (2009) (discussing the differences 
between rule of reason standard and per se liability). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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negative effects.38 Among the facts to be considered in rule of reason 
analysis are the specific facts of the business and of the restraint 
imposed, the condition of the business before and after the restraint, 
and the purpose of imposing the restraint.39 
The Supreme Court’s treatment of professional sports leagues in 
the antitrust setting has evolved over time.40 The Court first addressed 
the issue in Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of 
Professional Baseball Clubs,41 and determined that Major League 
Baseball was exempt from antitrust laws on the basis that professional 
baseball was not engaged in interstate commerce.42 Since then, 
however, the Court has declined to extend Federal Baseball to other 
professional sports leagues, including the NFL.43 In Radovich v. NFL, 
for example, the Court concluded that any antitrust exemption for the 
NFL should be left to the discretion of Congress.44 Because Congress 
had previously considered, and declined, to extend exemptions to 
professional sports leagues other than Major League Baseball, the 
Court reasoned that it was Congress’s intent that the Sherman Act 
apply to the NFL.45 The language in subsequent legislation, such as 
the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961,46 has been interpreted by some 
as reinforcing that basic premis
The issue in American Needle, Inc. v. NFL primarily concerns the 
Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence 
Tube Corp. In Copperweld, the Court held that an agreement between 
a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary did not violate the 
Sherman Act.47 In arriving at its decision, the Court reasoned that 
because a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have “a complete 
unity of economic interest,” there is no need to apply the Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act to its inner dealings, as the Act implicates only those 
agreements that involve a “sudden joining of economic resources that 
 38. Id. 
 39. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918). 
 40. See LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4:16 (4th ed. 2009) 
 41. Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
 42. Id. at 209. 
 43. See, e.g., Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (applying antitrust laws to 
National Basketball Association); Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 447–48 (1957) (holding NFL’s 
activities “within the coverage of the antitrust laws”). 
 44. See Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452 (“We . . . conclude that the orderly way to eliminate error 
or discrimination, if any there be, is by legislation and not by court decision.”). 
 45. Id. at 450 n.7. 
 46. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2008)(granting leagues an “exemption” from antitrust laws 
for agreements concerning television broadcasting). 
 47. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984). 
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had previously served different interests.”48 In other words, a parent 
and wholly owned subsidiary are treated like a single firm, incapable 
of constituting the plurality of actors necessary to form a conspiracy 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.49 
Following Copperweld, many professional sports leagues began to 
argue that they should be considered single entities immune from 
Section 1 scrutiny.50 Unlike most courts of appeals, which have 
rejected this argument,51 the Seventh Circuit has been more receptive 
to sports leagues’ single entity claims.52 Although the Supreme Court 
has not yet ruled on Copperweld’s applicability to intra-league 
agreements between separately owned teams in professional sports 
leagues,53 in NCAA v. Board of Regents54 the Court applied Section 1 
and the rule of reason to an agreement between separately owned 
and controlled sports teams in the college football setting.55 Thus, the 
American Needle decision should help to clarify the scope of 
Copperweld’s single entity exception and resolve the current circuit 
split on Copperweld’s applicability to professional sports leagues. 
IV. HOLDING 
On review, the Seventh Circuit addressed de novo whether the 
district court properly granted summary judgment.56 First, the court 
recognized that the Seventh Circuit had yet to definitively rule on 
whether professional sports leagues can be considered “single 
entities” under Copperweld.57 While the circuit court acknowledged 
that such a determination is difficult, it recognized that the court had 
previously “embraced the possibility that a professional sports league 
could be considered a single entity under Copperweld.”58 Noting that 
“the question of whether a professional sports league is a single entity 
should be addressed not only ‘one league at a time,’ but also ‘one facet 
 48. Id. at 771. 
 49. Id. at 776–77. 
 50. See, e.g., NHL Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462, 470 (6th 
Cir. 2005); Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 2002); Sullivan v. 
NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1099 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 51. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 7, at 30. 
 52. See generally American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 538 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2008); Chicago 
Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 53. Brief of the NFL Respondents, supra note 19, at 41. 
 54. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85(1984). 
 55. Id. at  99–103. 
 56. American Needle, 538 F.3d at 741. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 742. 
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of a league at a time,’”59 the circuit court limited its review to the NFL 
teams’ agreement to collectively license their intellectual property 
through NFLP.60 
Not convinced that the potential for competition between the 
NFL teams in intellectual property licensing should defeat the NFL’s 
single entity claim, the court held that the NFL teams function as a 
single source of economic power because the teams share “a vital 
economic interest in collectively promoting NFL football” in 
competition with other forms of entertainment.61 Applying that 
analysis, the court found that because the NFL teams have acted as a 
single intellectual property licensing entity since 1963, the district 
court acted appropriately in finding that the NFL teams act as a single 
entity and granted summary judgment in favor of the NFL 
defendants.62 
V. ARGUMENTS 
A. American Needle’s Key Arguments 
American Needle argues that long-standing precedent dictates 
that Section 1 of the Sherman Act applies to all agreements between 
separately owned and controlled competitors.63 Because the NFL’s 
teams are separately owned and operated, it logically follows that any 
agreement between the NFL teams is subject to Section 1 scrutiny.64 
According to American Needle, the Supreme Court has, for over a 
century, consistently held that agreements between separately owned 
and controlled entities are subject to Section 1 scrutiny.65 Copperweld 
did not change this custom, American Needle argues, but rather 
reinforced it by distinguishing the lack of anticompetitive risk in 
agreements between commonly owned and controlled corporations 
from those risks inherent in agreements between separately owned 
entities.66 In support of this interpretation, American Needle points 
out that neither the Supreme Court nor the various courts of appeals 
have extended Copperweld’s single entity exemption outside of the 
 59. Id. (quoting Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 743. 
 62. Id. at 744. 
 63. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 7, at 10. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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context of parent companies and their wholly-owned subsidiaries.67 
Furthermore, American Needle argues that because NFL teams can 
and do compete in various fields including licensing and 
merchandising, the relationship between the teams is fundamentally 
different from the parent/subsidiary relationship found in 
Copperweld.68 Therefore, American Needle argues, the Supreme 
Court should reverse the Seventh Circuit’s decision and apply Section 
1 scrutiny in accordance with the prior holdings of the Supreme Court 
and the various courts of appeals.69 
American Needle also argues that the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
conflicts with Congress’s intent to subject agreements between 
separately owned and controlled sports teams to Section 1 scrutiny.70 
To support its claim, American Needle points to two legislative 
measures, the Sports Broadcasting Act71 and the Curt Flood Act,72 
both of which it argues are “premised” on the notion that antitrust 
laws apply to agreements between separately owned professional 
sports teams.73 American Needle adds that, in the past, two different 
NFL Commissioners approached Congress in hopes of obtaining an 
antitrust exemption for the League, and each time Congress rejected 
the requests.74 
Finally, American Needle argues that the Seventh Circuit erred in 
determining that the need of NFL teams to cooperate to produce 
football games justified classifying the NFL and its teams as a “single 
entity,” pointing out that “while it takes two teams to play a football 
game . . . it does not inherently require a league—much less a league 
governed by cooperation among economic competitors, and even less 
a league that by agreement forbids competition in off-field 
enterprises like the licensing of intellectual property.”75 American 
Needle notes that there are many types of joint ventures held to 
Section 1 scrutiny that, like the NFL, create a product that cannot be 
 67. Id. at 25; see also Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1148 (9th Cir. 
2003) (emphasizing the importance of “economic unity” in making a single entity 
determination); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 214 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (declining to extending Copperweld to an agreement between “legally separate 
entities”). 
 68. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 7, at 27–28. 
 69. Id. at 28. 
 70. Id. at 31. 
 71. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2008). 
 72. 15 U.S.C.A. § 26b(a). 
 73. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 7, at 33–34. 
 74. Id. at 34–36. 
 75. Id. at 42–43. 
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created by the individual entities alone.76 
B. NFL’s Key Arguments 
The NFL argues that any decisions about the promotion of NFL 
football are that of a single entity.77 Pointing first to Copperweld, the 
NFL argues that “substance, not form” is the appropriate test for 
determining whether Section 1 should apply to the NFL and its 
member teams.78 Rather than competing against each other, the NFL 
asserts that the clubs are set up to produce a “single product”79 that 
competes against other entertainment providers.80 Because of this, the 
NFL argues each individual club’s economic power “depends, and has 
always depended, on the cooperation among themselves.”81 Indeed, 
the NFL argues that the individual clubs and their respective 
intellectual property have little value but for their association with the 
league.82 Furthermore, the NFL points out that the Seventh Circuit 
correctly determined that, in the field of intellectual property, NFL 
clubs have acted as a “single entity” sharing both revenues and costs 
for almost fifty years.83 Accordingly, the NFL argues that while the 
league’s separately owned and controlled member teams may appear, 
in form, to be independent sources of power, a substantive analysis of 
the league reveals that it is, in practice, a single source of economic 
power exempt from Section 1 scrutiny.84 
The NFL also refutes two specific arguments made by American 
Needle. First, the NFL challenges American Needle’s assertion that 
Copperweld requires a “complete unity of interest” for single entity 
treatment, arguing that such a standard is inconsistent with some 
courts of appeals decisions and would subject to Section 1 scrutiny 
“routine business decisions of other highly integrated entities, such as 
law firms whose partners rarely, if ever, have identical interests.”85 
Additionally, the NFL takes issue with American Needle’s claim that 
the Supreme Court has “repeatedly rejected” the idea that NFL and 
 76. Id. at 44. 
 77. Brief for the NFL Respondents, supra note 19, at 16. 
 78. Id. at 13. 
 79. Id. at 22. 
 80. Id. at 25. 
 81. Id. (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 
277 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
 82. Id. at 25–26. 
 83. Id. at 27–28. 
 84. Id. at 13–14. 
 85. Id. at 37–38. 
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its teams, as a single entity, are incapable of conspiring in restraint of 
trade within the league.86 Specifically, the NFL challenges American 
Needle’s reliance on Radovich, as that case concerned an agreement 
between two separate football leagues—not an intra-league 
agreement—and, the NFL argues, is not applicable to the present 
case.87 
Finally, the NFL argues that applying the rule of reason to 
professional sports leagues would subject every decision of a 
professional sports league to potential Section 1 attack, chilling 
cooperation within the league “to the detriment of competition and 
consumer welfare.”88 The NFL points to the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly89 for support, 
arguing that Twombly stands for the proposition that antitrust 
litigation “should be resolved at the earliest opportunity.”90 
Ultimately, by discussing another sports antitrust case, Major League 
Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino,91 where the litigation required 
three years of discovery and six years of court proceedings before 
summary judgment was finally granted for the defendant, the NFL 
makes the case that applying the rule of reason in this case will add 
unnecessary cost and delay while achieving the same end result.92 
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in American Needle is flawed for 
several reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on the “long 
history” of NFL teams’ collective licensing (through NFLP) is 
inappropriate, as a prolonged lack of competition can often be the 
result of an illegal restraint of trade.93 In addition, while the NFL 
teams’ decision to form NFLP in 1963 may have granted NFLP the 
exclusive right to license NFL teams logos and trademarks, it did not 
take away the individual teams’ ownership of their respective 
intellectual property.94 Indeed, despite the NFLP agreement, the 
 86. Id. at 41. 
 87. Id. at 41–43. 
 88. Id. at 49–50. 
 89. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 90. Brief for the NFL Respondents, supra note 19, at 50. 
 91. Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 92. Brief for the NFL Respondents, supra note 19, at 50. 
 93. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, No. 
08-661 (U.S. May 28, 2009) (“A cartel, for example, may have a long history, but that does not 
insulate the agreements supporting it from antitrust scrutiny.”). 
 94. Id. at 2. 
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NFL’s teams can and do compete in intellectual property licensing 
today, and because the teams’ continue to own their own intellectual 
property, each team has the potential to compete into the future.95 
Furthermore, despite the existence of NFLP, the individual teams still 
retained the power to veto the Reebok deal if they so desired.96 Thus, 
while the teams may have “effectively merged” their intellectual 
property operations through NFLP, the formation of NFLP did not 
completely eliminate the power of the NFL teams to control their 
intellectual property licensing, nor did it eliminate actual and 
potential competition as required under Copperweld for single-entity 
status.97 
Second, the Seventh Circuit’s expansion of Copperweld’s single 
entity exception is unwarranted. Aside from the professional sports 
leagues themselves, it seems there is widespread skepticism of 
whether Copperweld’s single entity rationale can apply to a joint 
activity between separately owned and operated clubs.98 The NFL 
teams are highly integrated entities that rely on agreements between 
themselves to prosper and succeed. A high level of economic 
integration is a rationale for applying rule of reason scrutiny, not for 
granting single entity immunity.99 The NFL’s argument—that applying 
the rule of reason is too costly and will have chilling effects on pro-
competitive decision-making—is indefensible for a number of 
reasons. First, there is little evidence that courts have erroneously held 
professional sports leagues liable for antitrust violations under the 
rule of reason, and the NFL has not offered any evidence suggesting 
that its teams have been deterred from entering into agreements for 
fear of antitrust liability.100 Second, because the Seventh Circuit 
incorporated elements of the rule of reason into its “single entity” 
analysis, the idea that single entity analysis reduces the costs of 
 95. Brief Amici Curiae for National Football League Players Association, Major League 
Baseball Players Association, National Basketball Players Association, and National Hockey 
League Players’ Association in Support of Petitioner at 18–19, American Needle, No. 08-661 
(U.S. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 96. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 93, at 2. 
 97. See Brief for the United States Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6, American 
Needle, No. 08-661 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 98. See id. at 6; Brief of Amici Curiae Merchant Trade Associations in Support of 
Petitioner at 19, American Needle, No. 08-661 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009); Brief of the American 
Antitrust Institute and Consumer Federation of America as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 31, American Needle, No. 08-661 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2009). 
 99. Brief of the American Antitrust Institute, supra note 98, at 13. 
 100. Brief of the American Antitrust Institute, supra note 98, at 31–32. 
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litigation is not necessarily a slam-dunk.101 Finally, whereas single 
entity analysis is a new and relatively undeveloped concept in case 
law, the rule of reason has been used for almost a century, and its 
principles are clear and easy to follow.102 
Third, the Seventh Circuit’s determination that the NFL and its 
member teams are immune from Section 1 scrutiny is contrary to 
congressional intent.103 Various pieces of legislation, such as the Sports 
Broadcasting Act, are necessarily premised on the assumption that 
Section 1 applies to the NFL’s activities—if Section 1 did not apply, 
there would be no discernable reason for the Act’s existence.104 
Indeed, the Sports Broadcasting Act is extremely specific as to what 
kinds of conduct it exempts from the reach of Section 1, suggesting 
that Congress knew what it was doing.105 This view is supported by the 
fact that Congress has repeatedly rejected the NFL’s efforts for an 
explicit legislative exemption from the Sherman Act, while, at the 
same time, granting immunity to other ventures.106 
Because of the pervasive analytical problems in the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision and its departure from the findings of other circuit 
courts, it is unlikely the Supreme Court will uphold the Seventh 
Circuit’s ruling. This does not mean that American Needle will 
ultimately be successful in its suit. The Court will likely remand the 
case so rule of reason scrutiny can be applied. Considering the 
numerous pro-competitive benefits of the NFLP that many 
organizations enjoy, 107 the NFL will be able to present a strong case in 
 101. See id. at 32 (“[I]nsofar as the Seventh Circuit’s single-entity test is merely a surrogate 
for rule-of-reason analysis, then it is not obvious that it would (or should) reduce discovery 
burdens.”). 
 102. See id. at 17–19 (“The analytical framework for assessing otherwise anticompetitive 
restraints that are related to an efficiency-enhancing integration is well-settled . . . . The decision 
below overturns this well-accepted analytical framework . . . . In addition, the court offered no 
coherent guide for determining how far afield from the underlying single-entity activity 
immunity should extend.”). 
 103. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 97, at 
23. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1293 (West 2008) (“The first sentence of section 1291 of this title 
shall not apply to any joint agreement described in such section which permits the telecasting of 
all or a substantial part of any professional football game on any Friday after six o'clock 
postmeridian or on any Saturday during the period beginning on the second Friday in 
September and ending on the second Saturday in December in any year from any telecasting 
station located within seventy-five miles of the game site.”). 
 106. See Brief of the American Antitrust Institute, supra note 98, at 34–35 (discussing 
Congress’s extension of antitrust immunity to other “highly integrated” joint ventures, such as 
agricultural and fishermen’s cooperatives and certain newspaper joint ventures.). 
 107. For example, the centralized licensing function of the NFLP allows organizations that 
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favor of upholding the agreement. Thus, while American Needle 
should shed some light on the future of the single entity defense for 
professional sports leagues, it seems likely that it will be quite some 
time before the case will be completely resolved on the merits. 
 
want to use the logos and marks of multiple NFL teams to purchase a license for all thirty-two 
teams in one transaction, reducing transaction costs for these organizations. Additionally, 
because the NFLP’s revenues and costs are shared equally by the thirty-two member teams, 
teams that do not perform as well on the field are able to compete economically with the more 
successful franchises, helping to maintain competitive parity on the field of play. See Brief for 
the NFL Respondents, supra note 19, at 8. 
